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Abstract We examine the effects of child policies on both transitional dynamics and 
long-term demo-economic outcomes in an overlapping-generations neoclassical growth 
model à la Chakraborty (2004) extended with endogenous fertility under the 
assumption of weak altruism towards children. The government invests in public 
health, and an individual’s survival probability at the end of youth depends on health 
expenditure. We show that multiple development regimes can exist. However, poverty 
or prosperity do not necessarily depend on the initial conditions, since they are the 
result of how child policy is designed. A child tax for example can be used effectively to 
enable those economies that were entrapped in poverty to prosper. There is also a 
long-term welfare-maximising level of the child tax. We show that, a child tax can be 
used to increase capital accumulation, escape from poverty and maximise long-term 
welfare also when (i) a public pay-as-you-go pension system is in place, (ii) the 
government issues an amount of public debt. Interestingly, there also exists a couple 
child tax-health tax that can be used to find the second-best optimum optimorum. In 
addition, we show that results are robust to the inclusion of decisions regarding the 
child quantity-quality trade off under the assumption of impure altruism. In 
particular, there exists a threshold value of the child tax below (resp. above) which 
child quality spending is unaffordable (resp. affordable) and different scenarios are in 
existence. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The past century has witnessed a dramatic increases in life expectancy (Livi-Bacci, 
2006). The importance of demography (longevity and fertility) in determining the 
macroeconomic performances of an economy in the very long term is the focus of a 
growing body of economic literature (Becker and Barro, 1988; Barro and Becker, 1989; 
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Ehrlich and Lui, 1991; Blackburn and Cipriani, 1998; Galor and Weil, 1999, 2000; 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002, 2008; Fogel, 2004; Cervellati and 
Sunde, 2005, 2011; Galor, 2005; Soares, 2005; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007; Lorentzen 
et al., 2008).1 
    A burgeoning theoretical literature based on models with overlapping generations 
(OLG) has dealt with the effects of infant mortality (Cigno, 1998, Fioroni, 2010) and 
adult mortality (de la Croix and Licandro, 1999; Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; 
Chakraborty, 2004; Chakraborty and Das, 2005; Bhattacharya and Qiao, 2007, Fanti 
and Gori, 2012a; Varvarigos and Zakaria, 2013) on economic growth and development. 
Adult mortality can be endogenised by considering how public health expenditure 
(Chakraborty, 2004), private health expenditure (Chakraborty and Das, 2005) or both 
(Bhattacharya and Qiao, 2007) affect an individual’s health status. 
    Within the class of OLG models with endogenous adult mortality, for our purposes 
the two most relevant papers are Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Chakraborty 
(2004). The former considers a general equilibrium OLG economy with endogenous 
fertility and endogenous longevity and three-period lived individuals who accumulate 
human capital through education – which is the main determinant of the probability 
of adult survival. Individuals produce and consume output, invest in education and 
spend a fraction of their lifetime taking care of their descendants. An increase in the 
individual life span creates a virtuous cycle of events for development. It increases 
labour productivity by increasing the returns of capital accumulation. This creates a 
reduction in child bearing time as well as an increase in the time devoted to education. 
This chain of events promotes (human) capital accumulation which then leads to a 
reduction in both adult mortality and population growth. In this context, Blackburn 
and Cipriani found that both low and high development regimes exist, the former 
characterised by low income, high birth rate and a relatively short life-span, the latter 
by high income, low fertility and a relatively long life-span. Depending on the initial 
conditions, therefore, an economy may be either entrapped in poverty or prosper. 
Their model is in agreement with the empirical evidence of the demographic 
transition.2 
    Chakraborty’s model introduces endogenous lifetime into Diamond’s (1965) model 
with exogenous fertility. The probability of surviving from work to retirement is a non-
decreasing concave function of an individual’s health status, which is determined by 
public investments. A rise in health taxes to finance health expenditure may lead to 
individuals living longer, which in turn provides an impetus to capital accumulation 
together with a higher life span. Chakraborty’s main finding is that, when the output 
elasticity of capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function is relatively high, 
endogenous mortality may cause development traps (represented by the stable zero 
equilibrium). This is turn means that low-income high mortality and high-income low-
mortality societies can exist. Chakraborty (2004) considered public health investment 
as a prerequisite for sustained economic growth and found that improving the health 
                                                 
1 See also de la Croix et al. (2012) who revisit the serendipity theorem of Samuelson (1975) with fertility 
and longevity. In addition, another strand of literature deals with the effects of infectious diseases on 
life expectancy, fertility and economic and development (Young, 2005; Chakraborty et al., 2010; 
Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan, 2011; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2012). 
2 In a model with educational investments and endogenous fertility, Chen (2010) developed an OLG 
model showing that: (i) with exogenous lifetime, multiple development regimes with club convergence 
exist when mortality rates are large, and (ii) with endogenous lifetime, a unique stable steady state 
exist when mortality rates are small. 
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status of people can be beneficial for growth and development. This is because it 
directly reduces the risk of adult mortality, which in turn causes an impetus to higher 
capital accumulation together with lower adult mortality. 
    With regard to population, it is well established that in recent decades several 
developed countries have experienced a dramatic drop in fertility, which has reduced 
the number of children even well below the replacement rate (e.g., Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Japan), while also causing a declining ratio of economically active to retired 
people. The response of many governments has been to implement child support 
programmes mainly based on the provision of child subsidies (e.g., a direct monetary 
transfer to families with children) in order to provide incentives for child care and to 
facilitate fertility recovery. Particularly in northern Europe, other policies have also 
been adopted such as child care facilities (e.g., investments in infrastructure for day-
care centres and schools) and child tax credits. 
    However, even the opposite problem of excessive population growth could represent 
a serious concern for economic growth and sustainable development in some countries. 
In these countries, therefore, a child-tax3 policy may be implemented in order to 
reduce the birth rate and thus alleviate environmental problems and social conflicts. A 
well known example is the one-child policy (or, alternatively, family planning policy, 
see Coale, 1981) which was introduced by the Chinese government in 1979, which 
probably represents the only case of tax penalties for couples with more than one child 
in the world. With regard to the technical rules of implementation, the one-child policy 
restricts the number of children that couples decide to have to one, although several 
exceptions exist, for instance, for couples living in certain rural areas of China or for 
ethnic minorities. Chinese families subject to the restrictions of the family planning 
policy have to pay fines based on their income if they choose to have more than one 
child. The monetary penalties, however, increase more than proportionally for any 
additional newborn. Of course, the enforcement of this policy is controversial because 
it had several unpleasant effects (especially as regards the moral feasibility of 
restricting the freedom of people as well as some of the methods adopted). However, 
such issues are beyond the scope of this paper.4 
    Since the seminal paper by Becker (1960), the economic literature has argued that 
the choice of the number of children should be the result of a rational choice of 
individuals, especially in developed economies.5 The theoretical literature on 
endogenous fertility is of greater importance in the theory of economic growth (e.g., 
Becker and Barro, 1988; Barro and Becker, 1989), and also serves as an explanation of 
                                                 
3 While public child support programmes have been extensively examined in economic literature 
(Peters, 1995; Momota, 2000; van Groezen et al., 2003; Apps and Rees, 2004; van Groezen and Meijdam, 
2008), the theoretical analysis of the effects of child taxes on long-term demo-economic outcomes is, to 
the best of our knowledge, relatively scarce. For instance, in the literature with endogenous fertility, 
Bental (1989) represents one of the first attempt to discuss the effects of child taxes in a model where 
children are considered as a capital good (old-age security hypothesis). He finds that a tax on children 
can achieve the optimal capital-labour ratio but fails to realise the optimal population growth. Recently, 
Fanti and Gori (2009) have shown that a child tax can be used to actually raise population growth in 
the long run, while also raising per worker GDP. 
4 For empirical evidence of population policies in China see McElroy and Yang (2000), Rosenzweig and 
Zhang (2009) and Wu and Li (2012). 
5 For instance, van Groezen et al. (2003, p. 237) argued that “The rate of fertility should therefore be 
treated as an endogenous variable, that is, as the result of a rational choice which is influenced by 
economic constraints and incentives. Economic theory can thus help in explaining why the observed 
decline in the (desired) number of children would occur.” 
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multiple regimes of development when human capital is considered (e.g., Becker et al., 
1990; Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002). 
    This paper is an attempt to introduce endogenous fertility into a Chakraborty-like 
model (2004). The focus is on the crucial role that family policies, consisting of either a 
tax or subsidy on children, can play on both the transitional dynamics and demo-
economic outcomes in the very long term. 
    Our main finding is that poverty or prosperity does not necessarily depend on the 
initial conditions, since they are the result of how child policy is designed. A fairly 
large increase in child tax reduces both fertility and adult mortality. This stimulates 
capital accumulation and eliminates the low equilibrium, so that an economy 
entrapped in poverty due to unfavourable initial conditions will converge towards a 
high development regime, where income per worker is high, life expectancy is high, 
and fertility is low. More importantly, in a Chakraborty-type economy a second-best 
optimal child tax policy exists that can be used to maximise steady-state welfare. This 
is because the increase in longevity and consumption by young people, which 
contributes to raise utility, more than compensate for the negative welfare effects of 
the reduction in fertility and consumption amongst older individuals. 
    In addition, in contrast to van Groezen et al. (2003) and van Groezen and Meijdam 
(2008), who showed that the optimal policy in an economy with public pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) pensions under fixed contributions and endogenous fertility is the use of child 
allowances as this helps to eliminate the external effects of children, we found that 
when longevity and fertility are endogenous: a child tax can be used to maximise 
steady-state welfare also when a public pension system is in place. Irrespective of 
whether PAYG pensions are in place, there exists a couple child tax-health tax that 
can be used as a second-best optimum optimorum policy. 
    This paper differs from the above mentioned studies in terms of its specific 
objectives, analyses and results. From a broader perspective, our paper belongs to the 
demo-economic literature that treats the key demographic variables – i.e. fertility and 
longevity – as endogenously determined in the model rather than exogenously given. 
It also links them to the process of economic growth in the simple and intuitive context 
of the standard OLG model. This paper can also be viewed as a contribution to the 
wider literature on multiple equilibria, poverty traps and demographic changes over 
the very long term (e.g. Azariadis and Drazen, 1990). 
    The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 studies 
the dynamic path of capital accumulation and provides necessary conditions for the 
existence of multiple (four) steady states. Section 4 analyses the effects of child taxes 
on economic growth, the stages of development and welfare. Section 5 introduces pay-
as-you-go public pensions and Section 6 considers problems of child quantity-quality 
trade-off under impure altruism. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7. Appendices A 
and B provide proofs of the main propositions. Appendix C shows that the results of 
the paper hold also when the government issues an amount of public debt in every 
period. 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a general equilibrium OLG closed economy populated by rational and 
identical individuals of measure tN  per generation. Each generation overlaps for one 
period with the previous generation and then overlaps for one period with the next 
Endogenous fertility, endogenous lifetime and economic growth 
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generation. Time is discrete and indexed by ,...2,1,0=t . The life of the typical agent is 
divided into childhood and adulthood. As a child, an individual does not make 
economic decisions. He/she consumes resources directly from his/her parents and 
survives to the end of youth with certainty (no child mortality). As an adult, an 
individual works and takes care of children when young, and retires when old. The 
young members of a generation t  are endowed with one unit of labour inelastically 
supplied to firms, while receiving a competitive wage tw  per unit of labour. When an 
adult, an individual of a generation t  draws utility from consumption when young, tc ,1 , 
consumption when old, 1,2 +tc , and the number of children, tn  (Eckstein and Wolpin, 
1985; Eckstein et al., 1988; Galor and Weil, 1996).6 
    We assume that the probability of surviving from youth to old age is endogenous 
and determined by an individual’s health status, which is, in turn, improved by the 
public provision of health investments when young th  (Chakraborty, 2004; 
Bhattacharya and Qiao, 2007; Fanti and Gori, 2012). The survival probability at the 
end of youth of an individual that belongs to generation t , pi t , depends on th  and is 
given by a strictly increasing (though bounded) function )( tt hpipi = . Following 
Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), we specify this relationship as follows: 
 δ
δpipi
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    Equation (1) is sufficiently general to capture the cases of both the monotonic 
(concave) function ( 1=δ ) used in the numerical examples by Chakraborty (2004), and 
the S-shaped function ( 1>δ ) used in the numerical examples by Blackburn and 
Cipriani (2002). Some clarifications regarding Eq. (1) are now useful. 
    Firstly, we define 0pi  as an exogenous measure of the natural rate of longevity of 
people (e.g., Ehrlich, 2000; Leung and Wang, 2010) irrespective of health investments. 
This measure of adult mortality may be different depending on the country because it 
is affected by both economic and non-economic factors – lifestyle, education, economic 
growth and standard of living, the degree of culture and civilisation, weather and 
climate changes, ethnic and civil wars, endemic diseases, and so on. Moreover, some 
underdeveloped and developing countries are trapped in poverty because of weak 
institutions, or due to climates that foster disease, or geographies that limit access to 
global markets, or simply by the fact that poverty is overwhelmingly self-perpetuating. 
For these and other reasons, we can realistically expect the value of 0pi  to be higher in 
developed rather than developing or under-developed countries. 
    Secondly, the parameter 1pi  captures the intensity of the efficiency of health 
investments on longevity. A rise in 1pi  can be interpreted as an exogenous medical 
advance due to scientific research, vaccination programmes and so on. 
                                                 
6 The way of modelling children as a desirable good that directly enters the parents’ utility is called 
weak form of altruism towards children (Zhang and Zhang, 1998). 
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    Thirdly, it is reasonable to expect that health investments have a more intense 
effect on reducing adult mortality when a certain threshold value of health investment 
is achieved, while they are barely effective when longevity is close to its saturation 
value – for example the functional relationship between public health expenditure and 
longevity may be S-shaped. The parameters δ  and ∆  capture this idea and determine 
both the turning point of )(hpi ′  and speed of convergence from the natural length of life 
0pi  to the saturation value 1pi . Given the value of ∆ , the parameter δ  represents the 
degree of effectiveness of public health investments as an inducement to higher 
longevity. In other words, it measures how an additional unit of public investment in 
health is transformed into higher longevity through health technologies. 
    If 1≤δ , )(hpi  is concave for any h  and, hence, longevity increases less than 
proportionally from the starting point 0pi  to the saturation value 1pi  as h  rises. Figure 
1 illustrates the shape of the graph of )(hpi  when 1≤δ : the solid (dashed) [dotted] line 
refers to the case 1=δ  ( 1<δ ) [ 0→δ ]. As can easily be seen, the lower (higher) δ  is, 
the more (less) efficiently an additional unit of health capital is transformed into 
higher longevity until a certain level of h  is reached. 
    If 1>δ , )(hpi  is S-shaped and threshold effects exist. Longevity increases more (less) 
than proportionally until the turning point Th  is achieved. However, an increase in δ  
shifts the longevity function to the right, while also increasing the speed of 
convergence from 0pi  to 1pi , as clearly shown in Figure 2, where the solid (dashed) 
[dotted] line refers to lowδ  ( highδ ) [ +∞→δ ]. This means that the more intense the 
threshold effects (high values of δ ), the slower an additional unit of health investment 
is transformed into a higher life span when h  is small, while reaching 1pi  more 
efficiently and rapidly as h  becomes larger. In other words, a rise in public 
expenditure on health is not effective until a specific value of health capital is achieved 
(and this value is higher, the higher δ  is). This is because, for instance, an adequate 
level of knowledge to enable such investments to be effectively transformed into higher 
longevity has not yet been obtained (see, e.g., Egger, 2009). As an example, think of 
the existence of the threshold effects in the accumulation of the knowledge required 
for new medical advances and discoveries in the treatment of diseases (e.g. vaccines) 
to be effective: the public health expenditure required to finance new research projects 
may be high and apparently of no tangible value until a certain degree of knowledge 
has been achieved. Beyond such a threshold, however, there is a “sudden” effect that 
triggers and highlights the beneficial effects of the new discoveries, to make them 
efficient, usable and operative across populations and eventually transformed into 
higher longevity. 
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Figure 1. Longevity and public health expenditure when 1≤δ . 
 
 
Figure 2. Longevity and public health expenditure when 1>δ . 
 
    As in Chakraborty (2004), we assume that the public health expenditure per worker 
at time t  ( th ) is financed with a balanced budget by levying a (constant) wage income 
tax at the rate 10 << τ . The government health accounting rule, therefore, is given by 
the following formula: 
 tt wh τ= . (2) 
    With regard to child care activities, we assume that raising children is costly for 
young parents. The amount of resources needed to take care of a child is given by twq , 
where 10 << q  is the percentage of the cost of children of the parents’ working income.7 
This element captures all needs required for the upbringing of children, included food, 
schooling and so on. In addition, we assume that the government finances (with a 
balanced budget) a wage subsidy by levying a constant per child tax.8 Therefore, the 
child policy budget in per worker terms at time t  reads as follows: 
                                                 
7 See Wigger (1999) and Boldrin and Jones (2002). 
8 For instance, the tax penalties imposed by the Chinese birth planning programme on parents with 
more than one child are currently computed as a fraction of either the disposable income of people living 
in urban areas or cash income (estimated by the local authorities) of people living in rural area. In 
general, they are proportional to the number of children that exceeds the quota planned by the 
government. 
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 tttttt nbnwbw =⇒= θθ . (3) 
The left-hand side shows the wage subsidy expenditure, and the right-hand side, the 
child tax receipt, where 0>b  is the fixed percentage of wage income collected by the 
government as a tax for every additional child, 0>tθ  is the wage subsidy rate adjusted 
over time to balance the budget, and tn  is the individual number of children at time t . 
    Therefore, the budget constraint of a young individual of generation t  is the 
following: 
 )1()(
,1 tttttt wnwbqsc θτ +−=+++ , (4.1) 
i.e. the disposable (working) income is divided between material consumption when 
young, savings ( ts ), and the cost of raising tn  children. 
    When old, individuals retire and live with the amount of resources saved when 
young plus the expected interest accrued from time t  to time 1+t  at the rate etr 1+ . 
Following Chakraborty (2004), we assume a (perfect) market for annuities exists, so 
that the budget constraint when old (time 1+t ) of an individual of generation t  can be 
expressed as follows: 
 t
t
e
t
t s
R
c
pi
1
1,2
+
+ = , (4.2) 
where et
e
t rR 11 1: ++ +=  is the expected interest factor. 
    By taking the wage, the expected interest rate, the longevity rate and the 
government budget constraints Eqs. (2) and (3) as given, the individual representative 
of generation t  chooses how many children to have and how much to save from of 
his/her disposable income, in order to maximise the expected lifetime utility function 
(see Abel, 1985). This can be expressed as: 
 { } )ln()ln()ln(max 1,2,1, tttttsn nccUtt γpi ++= + , (5) 
subject to Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2), where 0>γ  captures the parents’ relative desire to have 
children. The constrained maximisation of Eq. (5) gives the demand for children and 
savings, respectively: 
 ))(1(
)1(
bq
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t +++
+−
=
γpi
θτγ
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γpi
θτpi
++
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t
ttt
t
w
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Now, using Eq. (3) to eliminate tθ  and rearrange terms, Eqs. (6.1) and (6.2) can be 
written as follows: 
 
qbq
n
t
t γpi
τγ
+++
−
= ))(1(
)1(
, (7.1) 
 
qbq
bqw
s
t
tt
t γpi
τpi
+++
+−
= ))(1(
))(1(
, (7.2) 
Since one of the objectives of this paper is to study the effects of child tax on both 
transitional dynamics and long-term demo-economic outcomes, the role played by b  in 
a partial equilibrium context is interesting. A rise in child tax increases the marginal 
cost of raising an extra child and thus makes it more convenient to opt for 
consumption rather than having children. As a direct partial equilibrium effect, Eqs. 
(7.1) and (7.2) show that a rise in child tax reduces the demand for children and 
increases the need to save in the short term. 
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    In the following section we introduce production of goods and services and 
characterise the general equilibrium features of the model. 
 
2.1. Production and equilibrium 
 
We assume that firms are identical and act competitively on the market. The 
production function of the representative firm is the standard neoclassical Cobb-
Douglas technology with constant returns to scale, that is 
αα −
=
1
ttt LAKY , where tY , tK  
and tt NL =  are output, capital and labour input at time t  respectively, 0>A  is a scale 
parameter and 10 << α  is the output elasticity of capital. Defining ttt NKk /:=  and 
ttt NYy /:=  as capital and output per worker, respectively, the intensive form 
production function is 
α
tt Aky = . By assuming that output is sold at the unit price and 
capital totally depreciates at the end of every period, profit maximisation implies that 
factor inputs are paid their marginal products, that is: 
 
1−
=
αα tt AkR , (8) 
 
αα tt Akw )1( −= . (9) 
    On the basis that populations evolve according to the equation ttt NnN =+1 , the 
market-clearing condition in the capital market is given by ttt skn =+1 , which is 
combined with Eqs. (7.1) and (7.2) to obtain: 
 )(1 bqwk ttt +=+ γ
pi
. (10.1) 
By using Eqs. (1), (2), (9) and (10.1), the dynamic path of capital accumulation is 
described by the following first order non-linear difference equation: 
 )(:)1(
)( 10
1 t
t
tt
t kGk
kDkk =
Β+
Β+
=+ αδ
αδα
γ
pipi
, (10.2) 
where 0])1([: >−∆=Β δατ A  and 0)1)((: >−+= AbqD α . Although Eq. (10.2) is a simple 
first order non-linear difference equation, the dynamic features  that it gives rise to 
are interesting, especially from a policy perspective. 
 
3. Dynamics and steady states 
 
From Eq. (10.2) it is clear that when 0=τ  (i.e., no health investments) a unique locally 
asymptotically stable steady state exists (as in Diamond, 1965), because 0=Β . In 
contrast, when 10 << τ , the following proposition shows that development traps are 
possible. 
 
Proposition 1. The dynamic system described by Eq. (10.2) admits either two steady 
states },0{ k , with 0>k  (only the positive state being asymptotically stable) or four 
steady states },,,0{ 321 kkk , with 0123 >>> kkk  (only the second and the forth being 
asymptotically stable). Furthermore, (1) a sufficient condition to avoid development 
traps is 02 >Λ  and 03 >Λ , and (2) a necessary condition for the existence of multiple 
steady states is that at least either 02 <Λ  or 03 <Λ  holds, where 
L. Fanti, L. Gori 
 10 
[ ])21(1)]1(1[:2 δαδα +−+−−Β=Λ FE , )]1(1[)]21(1[: 03 δαδαpi +−+−−Β=Λ E , 
0)]([: 0110 >Β−++= pipiδpipiE  and 0: 21 >= BF pi . 
 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 1 says that multiple development regimes are possible when longevity is 
endogenous and determined by an individual health measure augmented by public 
investments through the longevity function Eq. (1). 
    Note that the scenario 00 =pi  and 1=δ  resembles the case studied by Chakraborty 
(2004) in a model with exogenous fertility. The assumption of a positive natural rate of 
longevity, however, exposes the economy to a dramatic change. The zero equilibrium – 
which is an attractive equilibrium point when 00 =pi  and α  is sufficiently high – is 
always unstable when 00 >pi , and the number of steady states passes from three to 
four. This thus makes the comparison of demo-economic performances between low 
and high income countries more plausible. In fact, although the existence of a stable 
zero equilibrium may be a useful abstraction to represent poorer economies, it 
certainly suffers from a lack of realism, especially with regard to the empirical 
significance of the results. 
    Proposition 1 provides sufficient conditions to avoid development traps and 
necessary but not sufficient conditions to have multiple steady states. As can easily be 
ascertained from Eq. (12.2), this depends on the key parameters of the problem and 
the policy variable τ . However, as extensive numerical simulations revealed, the 
existence of multiple regimes of development crucially depends on the mutual 
relationship between the output elasticity of capital (α ) and on how effective public 
health investments are on longevity (δ ). For any given value of δ , development traps 
are more likely to occur when production is relatively capital-oriented (high values of 
α ). When 1=δ  multiple steady states appear when α  exceeds 2/1 , and this threshold 
monotonically reduces as δ  increases. This is in line with Chakraborty (2004, 
Proposition 1, (i), p. 126). 
    We also note that Bunzel and Qiao (2005) have shown that the second part of 
Proposition 1 (i) by Chakraborty “is incorrectly stated” (Bunzel and Qiao, 2005, p. 4), 
because 2/1>α  represents a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of 
multiple steady states (a high value of the scale parameter A  of course is required to 
avoid the existence of a unique, degenerate equilibrium). Nevertheless, it still remains 
true that when 2/1>α  three steady states can exist, so that the central result by 
Chakraborty (2004) is unaltered even after the critique by Bunzel and Qiao (2005). 
However, since 0=k  is an attractive equilibrium point in this context, high values A  
can drastically reduce the basin of attraction towards the low stable steady state. 
However the possibility of eliminating the poverty trap does not exist whatever the 
level of technological development. Therefore, when there are threshold effects of 
health capital on longevity (i.e. 1>δ ), a wider range of economies are likely to be 
characterised by development traps, since the output elasticity of capital that 
discriminates between a single regime and multiple regimes of development is 
empirically more plausible and smaller than 2/1  (as shown in the numerical example 
below). 
    Now, let us assume that economies differ exclusively with regard to the initial 
condition 0k . Figure 3 depicts all the possible outcomes of an economy with 
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endogenous longevity and endogenous fertility. The figure clearly shows that an 
economy that starts below the unstable equilibrium 2k  is entrapped in the low regime 
( 1k ), where income per worker is low, fertility is high, and mortality is high. In 
contrast, an economy that starts beyond the threshold 2k  converges towards the high 
regime ( 3k ), where income per worker is high, fertility is low, and mortality is low. 
Therefore, an exogenous shift in the initial conditions may cause a change in the 
development regime. This is in agreement with Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and 
Chakraborty (2004). Unlike the former paper, where the main determinant of the 
reduction in adult mortality is the private education expenditure that increases 
human capital, our findings hold in a model where an adult mortality reduction is due 
to increases in public health expenditure. 
 
 
Figure 3. Multiple steady states. 
 
    A numerical experiment to illustrate Proposition 1 now follows. We take the 
parameter values: 2.12=A , 33.0=α , 1=γ , 3.00 =pi , 95.01 =pi , 10=δ , 1=∆ , 3.0=q , 
1.0=τ  and 0=b .9 Therefore, the low regime is characterised by the equilibrium values 
72.01 =k , 33.0)( 1 =kpi  and 29.1)( 1 =kn . In contrast, the high regime is characterised by 
the equilibrium values 88.23 =k , 83.0)( 3 =kpi  and 06.1)( 3 =kn . The unstable equilibrium 
stock of capital that discriminates between poor and rich countries is 7.12 =k . 
Therefore, an economy that for some exogenous reasons starts with a stock of capital 
below (resp. above) such a threshold level of development will end up in the low (resp. 
high) regime, where income per worker is small (resp. large) and mortality and 
                                                 
9 A value of the output elasticity of capital (α ) of one third is usual to represent developed economies 
(Gollin, 2002). According to Zhang et al. (2001), a value of the taste for the number of children included 
in the range 5.18.0 ≤≤ γ  is reasonable to capture the parents’ taste of children relative to material 
consumption in the utility function (according to the specification of preferences given by Eq. 5). 
Moreover, the values of both the scale parameter A  and percentage of child cost on working income q , 
are chosen to get a value of long-run fertility close enough to unity to be as much as realistic as possible 
in representing actual developed economies. The value 10=δ  follows de la Croix and Ponthière (2010). 
Finally, 1.0=τ  implies a ratio of health expenditure to per worker GDP of almost 7 per cent (which is 
an average value for developed countries, see World Health Statistics, 2010) when 0=b . We note that 
similar results (not reported in the paper for economy of space) can be found with different parameter 
values. 
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fertility rates are high (resp. low), confirming some of the most striking aspects of the 
so-called demographic transition. 
    However poverty or prosperity may not necessarily depend on initial conditions. An 
added value of this paper, in fact, lies in the importance of determining the role of the 
child policy variable b  on transitional dynamics, long-run demo-economic outcomes 
and welfare. The next section deals with these topics and the main findings are: (i) a 
sufficiently large increase in child tax should be able to eliminate the vicious cycle and 
ill-health of poverty, thus allowing those economies that were entrapped in poverty 
due to unfavourable initial conditions to end up in the high regime of development; (ii) 
in an economy with public health investment, a value of child tax exists that 
maximises long-term welfare. 
 
4. Child policy and welfare 
 
Child allowances in the form of direct monetary transfers entitled to families with 
children have often been proposed by both politicians and economists as a remedy 
against low fertility, and have been used extensively in several European countries, 
which are amongst those most plagued by sharp reductions in population growth rates 
over the last few decades.10 In contrast, the Chinese one-child per family programme 
was enforced, among other things, as a stimulus to economic growth because over-
population. As such it possibly represents the most interesting case of tax penalties on 
children in the world.11 
    It may be interesting, therefore, to study the effects of child taxes on demo-economic 
outcomes in the context of multiple steady states. An analysis of b  from Eq. (10.2) 
gives the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. When the government invests in public health and development traps 
exist, a sufficiently large increase in child tax leads to the loss of the lowest stable 
steady state, 1k , thus allowing poorer economies to permanently escape from poverty 
and converge towards the highest equilibrium, 3k . 
 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
Proposition 2 shows that in a context of multiple steady states, a rise in child tax 
increases extreme stable steady states, reduces intermediate unstable steady states, 
while reducing the size of the basin of attraction of the poverty trap. A sufficiently 
large increase in child tax also shifts the graph of map )(kG  upwards and leads to the 
loss of the lowest stable equilibrium. This thus allows those economies that were 
previously stuck in poverty due to unfavourable initial conditions, to end up in the 
                                                 
10 Policies consisting in cash subsidies for children are largely adopted in several countries. As an 
example, in Italy a 1,000 euro child grant for each new born was introduced in the year 2005, while in 
Poland every woman will benefit from a one-off 258 euro payment for every child, and women from 
poorer families will receive double the previous amount. Evidence of a positive impact of family policy 
programmes (national expenditure for child allowances, maternity and so on) on fertility and women 
labour participation in western European countries can be found in Kalwij (2010). 
11 For instance, the one-child policy had the effect of reducing the Total Fertility Rate in China from 
more than five births per woman in the 1970s to slightly less than two births per woman in recent 
years. 
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high regime of development, where fertility is smaller and income per worker and 
longevity larger than with the lowest steady state. This because a rise in child tax, by 
increasing the total cost of children, reduces fertility and causes a rise in savings 
because of the increased needs for child-bearing purposes. This thus increases capital 
accumulation and, hence, the steady state stock of capital in both regimes of 
development. 
    Given Proposition 2 the following result holds. 
 
Result 1. For any given value of the health tax rate τ , a rise in child tax reduces adult 
mortality. 
 
Result 2. For any given value of the health tax rate τ , poverty or prosperity do not 
necessarily depend on the initial conditions, since they are the result of how child policy 
is designed. 
 
As discussed in Section 2, a rise in child tax reduces fertility and increases savings due 
to a partial equilibrium effect. This causes a rise in capital accumulation that shifts 
the graph of map )(kG  upwards for any 0>k , while also increasing stable steady 
states and wages in both the low and high income countries. Higher wages, however, 
translate into a larger health expenditure per worker – ceteris paribus with regard to 
the value of the health tax τ  – which reduces adult mortality in the long run. The 
increased survival probability causes an indirect general equilibrium feedback effect 
which acts negatively on fertility and positively on savings, and thus works as a 
stimulus to accumulate capital further on. As a consequence, the equilibrium output 
per worker increases, while the steady-state adult mortality and fertility rates shrink 
in both regimes. A sufficiently large increase in child tax, however, will stimulate 
capital accumulation and eliminate the low equilibrium, thus allowing those 
economies that were previously entrapped in poverty to prosper, irrespective of the 
initial conditions. 
    We will now illustrate Proposition 2 and Results 1 and 2 with the following 
numerical examples. We will take the same parameter values as in Section 3 and look 
at the effects of changes in b  on both macroeconomic and demographic performances 
over the very long term. Starting from the case 0=b , where the world is divided into 
poor and rich countries, Table 1 shows how the main steady-state variables react 
following a rise in child tax. As can be seen, a slight increase in child tax (from 0=b  to 
01.0=b ) drives capital accumulation, and also reduces adult mortality and fertility in 
both regimes of development. If we assume that childhood is 20 years of life and 
adulthood is divided, in turn, into a 30-year working period and a 30-year retirement 
period, a rise in child tax from 0 to 0.01 increases an individual’s probability of 
survival in poor countries  from 32.8 per cent of the whole time after the end of youth 
(i.e. individuals live about 9.7 years beyond their working life) to 33.7 per cent of the 
whole time after the end of youth (i.e. individuals live about 10 years beyond their 
working life), with an increase of almost 0.9 years of life. Adult mortality goes down in 
rich countries too, but to an even greater extent because the percentage increase in 
capital accumulation (and, hence, in wages) is higher than in poor countries. Raising 
the child tax from 0 to 0.01 causes a sharp increase in the lifespan of people in rich 
countries, which moves from 83 per cent of the whole time after the end of youth (i.e. 
individuals live about 24.3 years beyond their working period) to 85 per cent of the 
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whole time after the end of youth (i.e. individuals live about 25 years beyond their 
working life), with a gain of almost 1.5 years of life. 
    Increasing child tax further stimulates capital accumulation and produces a loss of 
the lowest stable steady states when b  goes beyond 0.025. Therefore, the low regime 
of development vanishes and the economies that were entrapped in poverty due to 
unfavourable initial conditions converge towards the unique high stable steady state 
(i.e. the phase map )(kG  lies everywhere above the 45° line and falls below it only once 
the high equilibrium 3k  has been achieved), with dramatic consequences for both 
macroeconomic and demographic outcomes. In fact, capital accumulation increases 
monotonically with the child tax and this increases the equilibrium wage rate. As a 
consequence, public health expenditure increases together with longevity, while 
fertility goes down considerably. 
 
Table 1. Child tax and multiple regimes of development. 
Low regime ( 1k ) 
b  0 0.01 0.02 0.025 
1k  0.724 0.793 0.895 0.998 
)( 1kw  7.348 7.573 7.88 8.17 
)( 1kh  0.734 0.757 0.788 0.817 
)( 1kpi  0.328 0.337 0.354 0.37 
)( 1kn  1.29 1.26 1.22 1.2 
 
High regime ( 3k ) 
b  0 0.01 0.02 0.025 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.2 0.3 
3k  2.88 3.19 3.45 3.58 4.16 4.6 4.82 5.26 7.5 9.9 
)( 3kw  11.59 12 12.3 12.45 13.08 13.53 13.73 14.13 15.9 17.42 
)( 3kh  1.16 1.19 1.23 1.24 1.3 1.35 1.37 1.41 1.5 1.74 
)( 3kpi  0.83 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.908 0.92 0.923 0.93 0.943 0.947 
)( 3kn  1.06 1.02 1 0.98 0.93 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.7 0.6 
 
So what about child allowance policy in a context of multiple steady states? We define 
child allowance (financed by a wage income tax 10 << tθ ) as qb <<0 , i.e. the net cost 
of children should remain positive to guarantee the existence of a finite positive 
solution for tn . As a consequence of introducing a child allowance scheme there is a 
partial equilibrium effect, which increases fertility and reduces savings. Capital 
accumulation, therefore, will be lower. This causes a reduction in the steady-state 
stock of capital and, hence, in the wage rate. Therefore, for any given value of the 
health tax τ , the health expenditure per worker shrinks and thus adult mortality 
increases in equilibrium. The reduced life span induces agents to have more children 
and this, in turn, decreases capital accumulation further on. Moreover, a large enough 
increase in child subsidy can produce a loss in the high equilibrium (i.e. the phase map 
)(kG  lies everywhere below the 45° line once the low equilibrium 1k  is achieved). In 
turn this implies that, irrespective of the initial conditions, all economies will end up 
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in the low regime of development, where income per worker is low, adult mortality is 
high, and fertility is high. 
    Table 2 shows the effects of child allowances on the main steady state variables in 
both low and high income countries. As regards the high development regime , Table 2 
highlights that a slight increase in child allowance (from 0 to 0.003) increases fertility 
and sharply reduces both capital accumulation and adult mortality (with a loss of 
almost two years of life). The high equilibrium vanishes as a consequence of a further 
increase in child allowance and, thus, the economies converge towards the low regime 
where capital accumulation is low, fertility is high and people’s lifespan tends to the 
natural rate 0pi . 
 
Table 2. Child allowance and multiple regimes of development. 
High regime ( 3k ) 
qb <  0 01.0−  
3k  2.88 2.40 
)( 3kw  11.59 10.91 
)( 3kh  1.16 1.09 
)( 3kpi  0.83 0.75 
)( 3kn  1.06 1.11 
 
Low regime ( 1k ) 
qb <  0 01.0−  05.0−  1.0−  2.0−  
1k  0.724 0.668 0.503 0.35 0.122 
)( 1kw  7.348 7.15 6.51 5.78 4.09 
)( 1kh  0.734 0.715 0.651 0.578 0.4 
)( 1kpi  0.328 0.322 0.308 0.302 0.3 
)( 1kn  1.29 1.31 1.43 1.6 2.09 
 
4.1. Welfare 
 
Let us now look at the welfare effects of child tax in an economy with public health 
investments in order to draw some conclusions regarding the desirability of the child 
policy. Since Golosov et al. (2007), either the Ρ –efficiency criterion or the Α –efficiency 
criterion can be used to compare alternatives when a population is endogenous. The 
former criterion implies that the preference profiles of both born and potential agents 
are evaluated in every state of the world (generation). The latter implies that only the 
welfare of those who are alive in every state of the world is evaluated to compare 
alternatives. However, we are now interested in maximising the steady-state expected 
lifetime welfare with respect to b  ( 0>b ) in an economy where public health 
investments are in place. The use of the notion of Α –efficiency will be used later in 
this section. 
    Knowing that consumption when young and consumption when old are given by 
qbq
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steady-state lifetime indirect utility index ))()()(ln()( )()(11 bb bRbnbcbV piγpi+=  with respect 
to b  for any 10 << τ , where )(bx  is the steady-state value of the generic variable x . 
    The effects of a rise in child tax b  on fertility and consumption are summarised by 
the following total derivatives: 
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Equations (11) and (12) highlight that a rise in b  negatively affects fertility, while it is 
ambiguous in terms of consumption. This is due to the fact that when the child tax is 
raised, young-age consumption increases: (i) due to a direct impact effect of the child 
tax, and (ii) because capital accumulation and wages become larger. However, the 
corresponding increase in longevity (see Result 1) tends to reduce consumption. Since 
interest rates also go down due to the increase in capital accumulation (thus leading 
towards a reduction in old-age consumption), and given the positive direct effect of 
increased longevity on expected lifetime utility (i.e., individuals enjoy a longer life 
span), the final effect on the steady-state welfare of an increase in child tax is 
ambiguous. Putting it in a more analytical form, the government’s (second-best) 
objective can be described by:12 
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for any 10 << τ , and the following result holds: 
 
Result 3. [Second-best child policy]. In an economy with public health investments, a 
value of child tax exists that maximises the steady-state lifetime indirect utility index. 
 
Using the same parameter values as in Section 3 and Table 1, Result 3 is illustrated in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Child tax and long-term welfare. 
Low regime ( 1k ) 
b  0 0.01 0.02 0.025 
)(1 bk  0.724 0.793 0.895 0.998 
)(bpi  0.33 0.338 0.355 0.376 
)(bn  1.29 1.26 1.22 1.2 
)(1 bc  2.84 2.95 3.09 3.19 
)(2 bc  14.19 13.9 13.41 12.89 
)(bV  2.168 2.203 2.255 2.31 
 
High regime ( 3k ) 
b  0 0.01 0.02 0.025 0.05 0.07 0.077 0.1 0.2 0.3 
)(3 bk  2.88 3.19 3.45 3.58 4.16 4.6 4.76 5.26 7.5 9.9 
                                                 
12 In Section 5.1 we discuss the use of both health and child taxes as a second-best optimal policy. 
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)(bpi  0.83 0.86 0.877 0.884 0.908 0.92 0.922 0.93 0.943 0.947 
)(bn  1.06 1.02 1 0.98 0.93 0.89 0.88 0.84 0.7 0.61 
)(1 bc  3.68 3.81 3.93 3.99 4.25 4.46 4.52 4.74 5.62 6.4 
)(2 bc  7.3 7.06 6.9 6.83 6.59 6.45 6.41 6.28 5.87 5.5 
)(bV  3.012 3.045 3.064 3.07 3.089 3.0945 3.0948 3.092 3.051 2.991 
 
    The economic reason for Result 3 is simple. When there is an annuities market , 
individuals do not take into account the benefits of an increase in public investments 
on their health and longevity. By positively affecting capital accumulation, the child 
tax leads to an increase in consumption and longevity, which directly contributes to 
increasing long-term welfare (because individuals live longer), despite the reduction in 
fertility and old-age consumption (because of the reduction in interest rates). When 
longevity tends towards 1pi  (i.e., the child tax goes beyond the welfare-maximising 
value 0.077), the rise in child tax does not actually work towards an increase in an 
individual’s life span. Thus the negative effects on welfare of the reduction in fertility 
and old-age consumption prevail and long-term welfare then tends to go down. 
Although the child tax can be welfare-maximising in the long run, the following result 
shows that: 
 
Result 4. In an economy à la Chakraborty (2004) with endogenous fertility, a child tax 
policy cannot represent an Α –Pareto improvement. 
 
    Since in this economy only the agents who are actually born at any time have a 
utility function that represents their lifetime preference profiles (with respect to 
material consumption and the number of children), the notion of Α –efficiency can be 
used to compare alternatives. The economic reason for Result 4 is simple. Let the 
health tax policy already exist at time t  and assume that the child tax policy is 
introduced at time t . Since the child policy only involves agents of generation t , the 
lifetime welfare of agents of generation 1−t  is negatively affected by the child tax 
exclusively through a reduction in old-age consumption ( tc ,2 ) because the interest rate 
at time t  becomes lower, with young-age consumption ( 1,1 −tc ) and fertility ( tn ) being 
unaffected. Therefore, through the child policy, some people end up better off and 
others are worse off (see Section 4.2 for details). This implies that a rise in child tax 
cannot be an Α –Pareto improvement. 
 
4.2. Transitional dynamics 
 
In order to evaluate the political feasibility of the child policy, it may be useful to 
study the (short-term) transitional effects of introducing a child tax in an economy 
with public health investments, as well as how much time is required to approach the 
steady-state welfare level. We recall that the parameter values are the following: 
2.12=A , 33.0=α , 1=γ , 3.00 =pi , 95.01 =pi , 10=δ , 1=∆ , 3.0=q , 1.0=τ . The low (resp. 
high) regime of development is thus characterised by the steady-state stock of capital 
72.01 =k  (resp. 88.23 =k ), and the stock of capital that discriminates between poor and 
rich countries is 7.12 =k . As usual, we assume that a generation consists of almost 
thirty years (see de la Croix and Michel, 2002). Then, by contrasting the lifetime 
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indirect utility index at different dates ( tV , where ,...2,1,0=t ), we compare a 
Chakraborty-type economy without a child policy ( 0=b ) with a Chakraborty-type 
economy where the government also adopts a second-best optimal child tax policy 
( 077.0=b ) introduced at time 0=t . 
 
Table 4. Transitional dynamics. Low regime (initial condition: 65.01 =−k ). 
 0=b  (no child tax) 077.0=b  (second-best 
optimal policy) 
1−V  2.12 2.07 
0V  2.14 2.18 
1V  2.152 2.27 
2V  2.159 2.35 
3V  2.163 2.44 
4V  2.165 2.55 
5V  2.166 2.69 
6V  2.167 2.82 
7V  2.168 2.94 
20V  2.168 3.0948 
 
Table 5. Transitional dynamics. High regime (initial condition: 7.21 =−k ). 
 0=b  (no child tax) 077.0=b  (second-best 
optimal policy) 
1−V  2.977 2.85 
0V  2.986 2.95 
1V  2.993 3.02 
2V  2.998 3.06 
3V  3.002 3.081 
4V  3.005 3.089 
13V  3.012 3.0948 
 
    As can be seen from Tables 4 and 5, the child tax policy does not represent an Α –
Pareto improvement (see Result 4) because the agents that belong to generation 1−t , 
with regard to the low regime of development, and the agents that belong to 
generations 1−t  and t , with regard to the high regime of development, are worse off 
when the second-best optimal policy is implemented. However, from time 1+t  
onwards, individuals of both the low and high regimes are better off. The poor 
economy escapes from the poverty trap and both the poor and rich countries approach 
the high-regime steady-state welfare level in almost twenty generations with regard to 
poor countries, and thirteen generations with regard to rich countries. 
 
4.3. Α –Pareto improving health policy 
 
In previous sections we have studied the effects on macroeconomic and demographic 
variables of the use of child taxes in an economy with health investments as in 
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Chakraborty (2004). We now go further and study the desirability of the introduction 
of health tax τ  (for the generations alive at the moment of the introduction of the 
policy), by considering for analytical simplicity the absence of child taxes ( 0=b ) in a 
Chakraborty-type environment with endogenous fertility and 1=δ . Results are 
summarised in the following proposition (which hold also in the case of exogenous 
fertility). 
 
Proposition 3. Financing a public health programme can represent an Α –Pareto 
improvement for the generations involved at the time of the introduction of it. 
 
Proof. We assume that a public programme is introduced at the beginning of time t . 
The generations involved are 1−t  and t . If none of them suffer, implementing it 
represents an Α –Pareto improvement. Putting it in an analytical form, the indirect 
expected lifetime utility of generation 1−t  is )ln( 11 11 1,11 −− −+−− = tt tttt RncV piγpi , where 
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=+1 . Let 0=t . As can easily be ascertained, for any given initial condition 
1−k , generation 1−  is Α –Pareto neutral because all arguments of 1−V  are independent 
of τ . With regard to generation 0 , there exist counterbalancing effects on welfare at 
work: on the one hand, health tax reduces disposable income, and increase longevity 
and capital accumulation in period 1. Then, consumption, fertility and the interest 
factor tend to be reduced by the policy. Overall, this causes a negative welfare effect. 
However, the increase in longevity causes a positive welfare effects because 
individuals directly enjoy by living longer. If the latter effect is large enough, the 
introduction of a public health programme is Α –Pareto improving for the generations 
involved. This of course depends on key parameters of the problem and initial 
condition. Analytically, we get: 
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    By using the parameter set 2.12=A , 33.0=α , 1=γ , 3.00 =pi , 95.01 =pi , 1=δ , 1=∆  
and 3.0=q , it can easily be verified that a health policy is Α –Pareto improving 
depending on initial condition. In fact, by assuming for instance 11 =−k , we get 
057.400 =∂
∂
=ττ
V
. 
 
5. Public pensions with defined contribution 
 
L. Fanti, L. Gori 
 20 
In this section we extend the model developed in Section 2 to allow for the existence of 
a public PAYG pension plan with defined contribution, i.e. the contribution is specified 
period by period. There is a burgeoning theoretical literature based on models with 
endogenous fertility that have studied the interaction of changes in fertility behaviour 
and pensions with different objectives (e.g., Cigno, 1992, 1995, 2010; Nishimura and 
Zhang, 1992; Cigno and Rosati, 1992; Wigger, 1999; Corneo and Marquardt, 2000; van 
Groezen et al., 2003; Abio et al., 2004; Cigno and Werding, 2007; van Groezen and 
Meijdam, 2008; Hirazawa and Yakita, 2009; Fenge and von Weizsäcker 2010; Fanti 
and Gori, 2012b, 2012c, 2013).13 
    As clearly pointed out by Cigno (1993), when fertility is endogenous, two positive 
externalities of children exist. One is due to the positive effect that an extra child 
implies on future output. The other is due to the reduction in the capital-labour ratio. 
When there are pensions, there is also an additional external effect of children because 
the benefit of having a child is too small to be internalised by parents (with the 
contribution to the PAYG system being shared among all the members of the working 
population). This makes the child allowance/tax policy important as an instrument to 
correct offspring externalities in economies with PAYG pensions (van Groezen et al., 
2003; Fenge and Meier, 2005, 2009; van Groezen and Meijdam, 2008) in order to 
achieve the social optimum. 
    The aim of this section is to show the effects of child taxes on economic growth and 
development, in an economy à la Chakraborty (2004) augmented with unfunded public 
pensions. In fact, it is useful to relate our analysis to the above mentioned literature 
justifying subsidising fertility in view of the positive externalities of having children 
when a PAYG scheme is in place. Therefore, in addition to the health expenditure 
financed by labour income taxes and the wage subsidy expenditure financed by child 
taxes (see Eqs. 2 and 3, respectively), we now assume that PAYG pensions 1−= ttt NpP  
exist to be redistributed across generations, where tp  represents pension expenditure 
per older people in period t . This expenditure is constrained by the amount of tax 
receipts tt Nwη , where η  is the contribution rate to the PAYG system. Since 
11 −−= ttt NnN , the per pensioner budget constraint of the government in period t  is: 
 11 −− = tttt nwp ηpi . (14) 
The budget constraints when young (Eq. 15) and when old (Eq. 16) of an individual of 
generation t  become : 
 )1()(
,1 tttttt wnwbqsc θητ +−−=+++ , (15) 
and 
 ett
t
e
t
t ps
R
c 1
1
1,2 +
+
+ += pi
. (16) 
    By taking as given the government pension budget, the other child policy variables 
and factor prices, the maximisation of the expected lifetime utility function Eq. (5) by 
the representative individual subject to Eqs. (15) and (16) gives the demand for 
children and savings as follows: 
                                                 
13 Other interesting papers that deal with this topic in models with exogenous (resp. endogenous) 
uncertain lifetime are Yakita (2001) and Hirazawa et al. (2010) (resp. Pestieau et al., 2008). 
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where 10 <+< ητ  must hold. Since market clearing in the capital market is still given 
by ttt skn =+1 , then together with Eqs. (17) and (18) we get the equilibrium condition: 
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. (19.1) 
By assuming that individuals have perfect foresight, i.e. 111
−
++ =
αα t
e
t AkR  and 
αα 11 )1( ++ −= tet Akw , Eq. (19.1) can be rewritten as follows: 
 )()1(1 bqwk t
t
t +⋅
−+
=+ γ
pi
αηα
α
, (19.2) 
where 1)]1(/[ <−+ αηαα . Now, by using Eqs. (1), (2), (9) and (19.2), the dynamic path 
of capital accumulation is described by the following first order non-linear difference 
equation: 
 )()1(1 tt kGk αηα
α
−+
=+ . (20) 
    As expected, Eq. (20) reveals that when a public pension expenditure is in place 
(positive values of η ), capital accumulation is lower than when it is absent, and a rise 
in η , which only affects the constant that multiplies )( tkG , monotonically reduces the 
accumulation of capital and the steady-state equilibria. From a graphical point of 
view, this means that when η  rises, everything else being equal the graph of )(kG  
shifts downwards but the shape is the same as in the model in Section 2. Therefore, 
Propositions 1 and 2 also hold when PAYG pensions exist. The following results can 
thus be stated. 
 
Result 5. Unlike van Groezen et al. (2003) and van Groezen and Meijdam (2008), who 
show that when a PAYG pension system is in place, a subsidy on children can be used 
to maximise long-term lifetime welfare in an economy with endogenous fertility, we find 
that in a Chakraborty-type economy with endogenous fertility and pensions, a child tax 
can be used to both escape from poverty and to maximise long-term lifetime welfare. 
 
Result 6. In addition, in a Chakraborty-type economy with PAYG pensions, the values 
of child taxes that can be used to escape from poverty and maximise long-term lifetime 
welfare are higher than the corresponding values in the absence of PAYG pensions, 
everything else being equal. 
 
The increase in the long-term lifetime welfare of individuals due to a rise in child tax 
is due to the fact that in addition to the externalities of children, another externality 
exists due to the increased life span, which is not taken into account by individuals in 
the market (the existence of a market for annuities in fact implies that the factor of 
interest is divided by average longevity). A rise in child tax, therefore, contributes to 
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reduce fertility and increase longevity in such a way as to maximise lifetime welfare in 
the long term. 
    In addition, Result 6 is due to the fact that when a PAYG system is in place savings 
are lower and fertility is higher than in the absence of it (crowding out effect). Since 
capital accumulation is lower with PAYG pensions (see Eqs. 10.2 and 20) then, 
everything else being equal, higher values of the child tax (which causes an increase in 
savings and a reduction in fertility) must be used to both escape from poverty and 
maximise the lifetime welfare of individuals in the long term as compared with an 
economy without pensions. 
    Results 5 and 6 are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5, and in Table 6. In particular, 
Figure 4 shows that the introduction of PAYG pensions reduces capital accumulation 
with respect to an economy without pensions. Then, higher values of the child tax 
should be used (ceteris paribus) to trigger the beneficial effects on macroeconomic 
variables than when no PAYG pensions exist. The figure exemplifies the case without 
child policy for the parameter set used in Sections 3 and 4. When pensions are absent, 
two regimes of development exist. The introduction of public pensions (by using a 
value of the contribution rate close to that of the German economy, i.e. 195.0=η  see 
Cigno and Werding, 2007) causes the disappearance of the high regime and thus the 
economies converge to the low regime irrespective of initial conditions. 
 
 
(a) 
Figure 4. Capital accumulation in an economy with PAYG pensions ( 195.0=η , see Feldstein, 2005 
and Cigno and Werding, 2007 for realistic values of the contribution rate to the PAYG system in several 
countries. In particular, we have followed Cigno and Werding, 2007 and we have chosen a value of η  
close to the value of Germany), and without PAYG pensions ( 0=η ) when no child tax exists ( 0=b ). 
Parameter set: 2.12=A , 33.0=α , 1=γ , 3.00 =pi , 95.01 =pi , 10=δ , 1=∆ , 3.0=q  and 1.0=τ  
(see Sections 3 and 4). 
 
    Figure 5 and Table 6 exemplify the effects of child taxes in an economy with 
pensions for the following parameter set (used also in Table 6): 7.13=A , 33.0=α , 
1=γ , 3.00 =pi , 95.01 =pi , 10=δ , 1=∆ , 3.0=q , 1.0=τ  and 195.0=η . Starting from a 
situation where two regimes of development are in existence when child tax is absent, 
the use of tax on children can allow to both escape from poverty (for a value of b  close 
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to 2 per cent) and maximise long-term welfare (for a value of b  slightly higher than 11 
per cent). In fact, the positive effects on welfare of the increase in longevity and 
consumption when young more than compensate the negative effects of the reduction 
in both fertility and consumption when old. 
 
 
Figure 5. Capital accumulation in an economy with PAYG pensions, with and without a child tax 
policy. The child tax is fixed at the steady-state welfare-maximising level ( 1135.0=b ). Parameter set 
(used also in Table 6): 7.13=A , 33.0=α , 1=γ , 3.00 =pi , 95.01 =pi , 10=δ , 1=∆ , 3.0=q , 
1.0=τ  and 195.0=η . 
 
Table 6. Child tax and long-term welfare in an economy with PAYG pensions. 
Low regime ( 1k ) 
b  0 0.01 0.015 0.02 
)(1 bk  0.53 0.59 0.63 0.73 
)(bpi  0.33 0.34 0.35 0.38 
)(bn  1.5 1.02 1.01 0.99 
)(1 bc  2.35 2.45 2.52 2.64 
)(2 bc  16.17 15.76 15.44 14.7 
)(bp  4.58 4.47 4.38 4.16 
)(bV  1.83 1.88 1.91 2 
 
High regime ( 3k ) 
b  0 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.1135 0.2 0.3 
)(3 bk  2.15 2.35 2.44 2.53 3.02 3.34 3.81 4.02 5.42 7.16 
)(bpi  0.84 0.87 0.878 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.935 0.944 0.947 
)(bn  0.9 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.8 0.77 0.73 0.71 0.62 0.54 
)(1 bc  3.19 3.31 3.36 3.42 3.71 3.89 4.16 4.27 4.96 5.68 
)(2 bc  8.64 8.44 8.36 8.29 8 7.85 7.67 7.6 7.23 6.87 
)(bp  2.45 2.39 2.37 2.35 2.26 2.22 2.17 2.15 2.05 1.95 
)(bV  2.88 2.92 2.93 2.94 2.99 3 3.009 3.01 2.99 2.94 
 
L. Fanti, L. Gori 
 24 
5.1. Second-best health and child policies 
 
Up to now we have considered a situation for which, for any given value of the health 
tax rate (τ ), the government had the purpose of using child tax b  to maximise 
expected lifetime utility at the stationary state (second-best policy), given that Result 
4 prevents Α –Pareto improvements of the child policy. Nevertheless, has Chakraborty 
(2004) shown that a welfare-maximising value of the health tax rate does exist, while 
Proposition 3 in this paper has shown that the introduction of health policy can be Α –
Pareto improving for the generations involved. 
    Then, government’s objective would be that of maximising expected steady-state 
welfare by choosing both the health tax rate and child tax. Unfortunately, although 
preferences are logarithmic, analytic expressions for welfare-maximising tax rates 
cannot explicitly be derived. Then, we proceed through numerical simulations to show 
that a couple ),( bτ  exists as a second-best optimal policy. 
    We assume the government has the objective of maximising 
 )),(),(),(ln(),( ),(),(11 bb bRbnbcbV τpiγτpi ττττ += , (21) 
with respect to τ  and b , for any τη −<≤ 10 , where ),( bx τ  is the steady-state value of 
the generic variable x . The maximisation of (21) implies 
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From Eq. (22) it can be shown through numerical simulation that )(bτ  (resp. )(τb ) is a 
monotonic decreasing function of b  (resp. τ ) for several parameter values. This 
implies that b  and τ  can be used as substitute policy instruments in this context. In 
fact, both policies act in the same direction on demo-economic variables by increasing 
longevity and consumption when young, and reducing fertility at the steady-state. 
Although closed-form expressions for )(bτ  and )(τb  are prevented, it is possible to find 
the coordinates of a point where the graph of )(bτ  and the graph of )(τb  intersect each 
other and expected steady-state welfare is at the highest possible level. Therefore, 
 
Result 7. There exists a couple of tax rates ),( VV bτ  corresponding to which the second-
best optimum optimorum is obtained for every τη −<≤ 10 . 
 
In order to illustrate Result 7, we adopt the usual parameter values: 7.13=A , 33.0=α , 
1=γ , 3.00 =pi , 95.01 =pi , 10=δ , 1=∆ , 3.0=q  and 195.0=η .14 In this context, 
)18.0,0877.0(),( ≅VV bτ , corresponding to which only the high regime exists and 
92.43 =k , 921.0),( =VV bτpi , 653.0),( =VV bn τ  and 025818.3),( =VV bV τ . Any deviations from 
the couple )18.0,0877.0(  reduces steady-state welfare. 
 
6. The child quantity-quality trade-off 
 
                                                 
14 Result 7 holds for several parameter constellations (with and without pensions) that are reported to 
save space. 
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In this section we introduce an additional element into the analysis: the child quality 
expenditure. For doing this, in order to preserve the structure of the OLG economy 
with endogenous fertility presented in previous sections under weak altruism towards 
children, we follow Strulik (2004a, 2004b) and consider an economy where parents 
derive utility from both the family size and quality of children they have. This line of 
reasoning have been initiated by the theory of child demand of Becker (1960), for 
which perfectly rational parents enjoy having children as well as putting effort in 
raising them (child quality), that is parental utility positively depends on having well 
educated children. Following Andreoni (1989), this individual behaviour is called 
impure altruism towards children. This approach markedly differs from the approach 
called pure altruism towards children (e.g., Becker et al., 1990), for which perfectly 
rational parents derive utility from the utility of their descendants. 
    To capture elements of impure altruism, we consider the following expected lifetime 
utility function where child quality is measured by the expenditure on children: 
 ))ln(()ln()ln()ln( 211,2,1 ttttttt wQqnccU ++++= + γγpi , (23) 
where tt wQq )( +  is total expenditure to take care of children, tQ  (control variable) is 
the portion of wage income devoted to schooling expenditure and q  can now be 
interpreted as the constant fraction of wage income spent on nourishing activities. The 
parameters 1γ  and 2γ  capture the parents’ relative desire to have children and 
parents’ relative desire to have well educated children, respectively. We assume that 
21 γγ >  to ensure the existence of some positive expenditure on child quality as an 
interior solution (maximum).15 
    This simple utility function leads to two different scenarios with regard to long-term 
demo-economic outcomes depending of the relative size of the child tax. In the former 
scenario, characterised by either a sufficiently low value of the child tax or child 
subsidy, parents do not voluntarily spend on child quality (corner solution) and choose 
to several children. In the latter one, characterised by a sufficiently high value of the 
child tax, parents voluntarily spend to have less and well-educated children (interior 
solution). This will be clear later in this section. 
    By also assuming the existence of PAYG pensions, the lifetime budget constraint of 
an individual representative of generation t  can be written as follows: 
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The problem of the representative individual at time t  is to maximise utility function 
(23) with respect to consumption when young ( tc ,1 ), consumption when old ( 1,2 +tc ), the 
number of children ( tn ) and the quality of children ( tQ ) subject to Eq. (24) and 0≥tQ . 
Then, the first order condition are the following: 
 et
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t R
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1,2
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= , (25) 
 tt
t
t wbQq
n
c )(1,1 ++=γ , (26) 
                                                 
15 To clarify this assumption, we note that utility function (23) can be rewritten as 
))ln(()ln()()ln()ln( 2211,2,1 tttttttt nwQqnccU ++−++= + γγγpi . For 21 γγ <  a sequence of feasible 
allocation may exist such that utility diverges to positive values. Then, 21 γγ >  is required. 
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 tt
t
t nwQq
c
=
+ 2
,1 γ . (27) 
Eq. (25) is the standard condition that equates marginal rates of substitution of 
consumption when young and consumption when old to prices. Eq. (26) drives the 
substitution between consumption when young and the family size. As far as marginal 
costs of raising an extra child increase (e.g., because child taxes increase), it becomes 
convenient to substitute children with consumption. Eq. (27) implies that at an 
interior solution child quality increase when consumption increase. Conversely, a rise 
in the family size implies a reduction in the expenditure for child quality because 
spending to have well educated children becomes more expensive. 
    By combining Eqs. (24)-(27) two distinct scenarios can be obtained depending on the 
value of the child tax. First of all, let 
 
2
21 )(:
γ
γγ −
=
qb , (28) 
be a threshold value of the child tax. 
 
Scenario 1 (no child quality expenditure). If bb <  (i.e., the government levies a low 
value of the child tax or provides child allowances) then child quality expenditure is 
not affordable ( 0=Q ) and demand for children and savings are given by Eqs. (17) and 
(18), respectively. This can be explained by the fact that a low value of child tax 
(alternatively, the provision of a child allowance) implies a sufficiently low marginal 
cost of children, which makes it convenient to increase the family size, reduce 
consumption and do not spend for schooling (corner solution). Therefore, the findings 
of previous sections hold. 
 
Scenario 2 (positive child quality expenditure). If bb >  (the child tax is sufficiently 
high) then child quality expenditure per child is affordable and the optimal solution is 
given by the following equations: 
 qbQQt −
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    When child tax becomes higher, individuals tend to have less children and spend for 
schooling because of the increase in marginal cost of raising a child and then marginal 
rates of substitution change accordingly at the optimum. In addition, the following 
proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 4. Given the parents’ relative desire to have children, the parents’ relative 
desire to have children of high quality and the fraction of wage income spent on 
nourishing activities, there exists a threshold value of the child tax above which 
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existence of child quality spending is guaranteed. An increase in the child tax increases 
child quality spending per child. 
 
Proof. The proof is straightforward from (28) and (29). Q.E.D. 
 
From Proposition 4 it is interesting to note that child tax has the potential to modify 
marginal conditions for the substitution of child quantity and child quality by 
individuals, thus allowing to end up in two different macroeconomic environments, 
where difference in longevity can also be observed. Everything else being equal, 
Scenario 1 in fact implies no child quality expenditure, lower capital accumulation and 
longevity and higher fertility than Scenario 2, where child quality spending is positive. 
These results are similar in spirit to main findings of Strulik (2004a, p. 438), where 
“parental behavior at the corner may generate economic stagnation while behavior at 
the interior may generate perpetual growth”. In his model, however, it is child 
mortality that determines either the corner solution or interior solution of child 
quality spending. 
    We now turn to the analysis of the macro-economy given firm’s behaviour. Market 
clearing in the capital market is ttt skn =+1 . Then, by using Eqs. (1), (2) and (9), and 
assuming individuals have perfect foresight, capital accumulation is described by: 
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where )( tkG  is defined in (10.2), )1)((
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γγ =1  when child quality expenditure is binding. From map (32) the following 
proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 5. Capital accumulation under Scenario 2 is higher than capital 
accumulation under Scenario 1 for every bb > . 
 
Proof. This statement can easily be proved by comparing the functions G  and G . 
Q.E.D. 
 
What is interesting to note is that Scenario 1 becomes the unique environment when 
governments provide child allowances to families. Differently, when child tax is 
applied the marginal cost or raising an extra child increases so that individuals want 
substitute child quantity for child quality and the shift from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 
is made possible depending on the relative size of child tax. 
    To illustrate this result, let us assume the following parameters values: 7.13=A , 
33.0=α , 11 =γ , 5.02 =γ , 3.00 =pi , 95.01 =pi , 10=δ , 1=∆ , 15.0=q , 1.0=τ  and 195.0=η . 
These are the same parameters than those used to exemplify the model with 
endogenous fertility and pensions under weak altruism, with the only difference that 
now parents also have preference for child quality ( 2γ ), and q  is lower than 0.3 
because it now only captures the nourishing cost of children, rather than summarising 
the whole cost to take care of them (nourishing plus schooling). To avoid to lengthen 
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the paper further, however, we do not present figures or tables to show this result, 
while restricting attention to a discussion of the main findings. This parameters 
generate 15.0=b . A child tax per child smaller (resp. larger) than 15 per cent implies 
no child quality spending and a sufficiently large family size (resp. child quality 
spending and sufficiently small family size). 
    Therefore, for any 15.0<b  Scenario 1 applies: there only exists the low regime of 
development when 134.0<b  and individuals do not spend on child quality. For 
instance, for 1.0=b  we get 0=Q , 36.01 =k , 31.0)( =bpi , 55.1)( =bn  and 33.2)( =bV . An 
increases in the child tax at 14.0=b  causes the appearance of two regimes of 
development. In the low regime, 0=Q , 49.01 =k , 325.0)( =bpi , 39.1)( =bn  and 
39.2)( =bV . In the high regime, 0=Q , 9.13 =k , 8.0)( =bpi , 16.1)( =bn  and 44.3)( =bV . A 
government which has the objective of maximising lifetime welfare in the long-term 
wants increase further the child tax. A rise in b  over 0.15 makes it convenient for 
individuals to spend for child quality and Scenario 2 then applies in a Chakraborty-
type economy. In particular, a child tax close to 0.16 allows to escape from poverty and 
long-term welfare is maximised in the high regime at 1855.0=b , corresponding to 
which 035.0=Q , 35.33 =k , 92.0)( =bpi , 88.0)( =bn  and 858.3)( =bV . As can seen, child 
tax favours the shift from nourishing expenditure to child quality expenditure which, 
in turn, implies different scenarios with regard to demographic and macroeconomic 
outcomes. 
    With regard to the second-best optimum optimorum in Scenario 1 (resp. Scenario 2), 
it can be reached at )12.0,1155.0(),( ≅VV bτ  (resp. )151187.0,110851.0(),( ≅VV bτ ), 
corresponding to which only the high regime exists and 557863.3),( =VV bV τ  (resp. 
86124021.3),( =VV bV τ ). 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
We have studied the effects of child policies in an overlapping generations model with 
endogenous fertility (under the assumptions of both weak altruism and impure 
altruism towards children) and endogenous longevity determined by public health 
investments (Chakraborty, 2004). We have assumed a sufficiently general form of the 
relationship between longevity and public health spending to include realistic features 
of the evolution of the lifespan of agents. When there are threshold effects of health 
capital on longevity, development traps appear under less stringent (and more 
empirically significant) conditions in the output elasticity of capital with respect to 
Chakraborty (2004). Thus, depending on the initial conditions, an economy may be 
either entrapped in a low development regime, where income and life expectancy are 
low and fertility is high, or converge towards a high development regime, where 
income and life expectancy are high and fertility is low. 
    However, the main message of this paper is that the limiting outcomes of the 
economy do not necessarily depend on the initial conditions. Regardless of whether an 
economy starts out with a low or high stock of capital, a child tax programme can be 
adopted to permanently escape the vicious cycle of poverty and ill-health, since it 
works as a stimulus to accumulate capital, increase income per worker and life 
expectancy, reduce population growth and maximise lifetime welfare in the long term. 
In addition, we have also shown that in a Chakraborty-type economy with endogenous 
fertility, a child tax can also be used as a second-best optimal policy when public 
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pensions are in place in order to escape from poverty and maximise steady-state 
welfare. Interestingly, in the case of impure altruism towards children we find that 
the child tax plays a preeminent role in determining both the substitution between the 
quantity and quality of children and the long-term demo-economic outcomes of an 
economy. In particular, when the government provides child allowances or levies a 
sufficiently low child tax, the marginal cost of raising a child is low and individuals do 
not want to spend on child quality and decide to have larger families. This causes 
lower capital accumulation and income per young person than when the child tax is 
high, because individuals tend to substitute quantity with quality of children in that 
case given the rise in marginal costs of having an additional child. Therefore, the child 
tax favours child quality spending which in turn causes higher income per young 
person and welfare of individuals. 
    This paper suggests that the child tax policy may have favoured the economic 
growth in recent years of economies such as China. Conversely, our results may also 
constitute a warning with regard to the effects of the more traditional child-subsidy 
policies: the price to be paid for stimulating a recovery in fertility in developed 
countries may be not only the expected reduction in GDP, but also the formation of 
development traps which may also be attractive for developing countries in the case of 
negative economic shocks. 
    Of course we are aware of the limitations of our analysis, especially with regard to 
policy applications. In fact we have presented a highly stylised theoretical contribution 
to the topic of endogenous longevity and endogenous fertility in a growth model with 
overlapping generations. However, it does represent a useful theoretical basis for 
future empirical contributions. Finally, this model could be extended along other lines 
including the following: (i) a private provision of health capital could be introduced 
and compared with the public health system; (ii) both young and old people could be 
entitled to public healthcare services; (iii) improvements in health care can have 
important economic effects in addition to a higher life expectancy: for instance, lower 
morbidity can increase both the productivity and wages of individuals (Strauss and 
Thomas, 1998) and thus may affect economic growth (Egger, 2009). With regard to a 
model with disease and infection dynamics, endogenous fertility could be introduced in 
an economy à la Chakraborty et al. (2010). 
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Lemma 1. Define the right-hand side of Eq. (10.2) as )(kG . Then, we have: (1.i) 
0)0( =G , (1.ii) 0)( >′ kG  for any 0>k , (1.iii) +∞=′+→ )(lim 0 kGk , (1.iv) 0)(lim =′+∞→ kGk , 
(1.v) )(kG ′′  admits at most three roots and 0)0( ≠′′G . 
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From Eq. (10.2), property (1.i) is straightforward. Differentiating the right-hand side 
of Eq. (10.2) with respect to k  gives 
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By defining xk =:αδ  as a new supporting variable, (A.1) can be transformed to: 
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Since no positive real roots of (A.2) exist, then (A.1) implies that 0)( >′ kG  for any 
0>k . This proves (1.ii). 
    Moreover, 
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which prove (1.iii) and (1.iv), respectively. Now, differentiating (A.1) with respect to k  
gives: 
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where 0)1(:1 >Β−=Λ Fα  and 0)1(: 04 >−=Λ αpi . Knowing that xk =:αδ , Eq. (A.3) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
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From (A.4), it is clear that ),( xkf  admits at most three roots for x  and 0)0,( ≠kf . 
Hence, from (A.3), )(kG ′′  admits at most three roots for k  and 0)0( ≠′′G  for any 0>k . 
This proves (1.v). 
 
Proposition 1 therefore follows. In fact, by properties (1.i) and (1.iii), zero is always an 
unstable steady state of Eq. (10.2). By (1.ii)-(1.iv), )(kG  is a monotonic increasing 
function of k  and eventually falls below the 45° line, so that at least one positive 
stable steady state exists for any 0>k . 
    Now, assume ad absurdum the existence of an odd number of equilibria. By (1.ii)-
(1.iv), there cannot be an odd number of inflection points for any 0>k . By property 
(1.v), therefore, the number of inflection points of )(kG  is either zero or two for any 
0>k . Since at least one positive stable steady state exists, then for any 0>k  the 
phase map )(kG  may intersect the 45° line from below at most once before falling 
below it. Hence, an even number of equilibria must exist. There are either two steady 
states, with the positive one being the unique asymptotically stable equilibrium, or at 
most one positive steady state separates the lowest asymptotically stable steady state 
from the highest asymptotically stable one, and, thus, the number of equilibria is four. 
    In addition, from Eqs. (A.3) and (A.4) we observe that if 02 >Λ  and 03 >Λ  then no 
inflection points of )(kG  exist for any 0>k , 0)( <′′ kG  and two steady states exist in 
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that case. In contrast, )(kG  has two inflection points for any 0>k  if at least either 
02 <Λ  or 03 <Λ  is fulfilled and, hence in this case four steady states can exist. 
 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Differentiating Eq. (10.2) with respect to b  gives: 
 
b
D
k
kkbkGb ∂
∂
⋅
Β+
Β+
=′ )1(
)(),( 10
αδ
αδα
γ
pipi
, (B.1) 
where 0)1(/ >−=∂∂ AbD α  for any ),0[ +∞∈b . Since ( ) 0, >′ bkGb  for any 0>k  and 
),0[ +∞∈b , then for any 0* >k  such that *1* ),( kbkG <  with ),0[1 +∞∈b , a threshold value 
1
* bb >  exists such that *** ),( kbkG = . Therefore, ** ),( kbkG >  holds for any *bb > . 
 
Appendix C. Public debt 
 
In this appendix we show that the main results of this paper also hold when the 
government at each date t  issues an amount tZ  of public debt and levies lump sum 
taxes ( ztτ ) on the young workers (Diamond, 1965; Jaeger and Kuhle, 2009; Spataro and 
Fanti, 2011). 
    The level of national debt evolves according to the following equation 
t
z
tttt NRZZ τ−=+1 , which can be transformed in per worker terms as follows: 
 zttttt Rzzn τ−=+1 , (C.1) 
where ttt NZz /:= . Following Diamond (1965), we assume that the (non-negative) level 
of debt is constant over time, i.e. zzz tt ==+1 . Thus, (C.1) becomes the following: 
 )( ttzt nRz −=τ . (C.2) 
    The maximisation of expected utility function (5) subject to the lifetime budget 
constraint 
 zttttte
t
tt
t wnwbqR
c
c τθτpi −+−=+++
+
+ )1()(
1
1,2
,1 , (C.3) 
gives the following demand for children and savings (upon substitution of (C.2) for ztτ ), 
respectively: 
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. (C.5) 
    Market clearing can now be expressed as ttt szkn =++ )( 1 . Then, by using (1), (2), (9), 
(C.4) and (C.5) we get: 
 zkGk tt −=+ )(1 . (C.6) 
Since the capital accumulation equation is the same as in the basic model of Section 2 
minus a constant, the main findings of the paper also hold qualitatively when the 
government issues a constant (non-negative) amount of public debt. 
    We have not pursued this analysis further to save space. However, numerical 
simulations (available on request) show that a child tax can be used to permanently 
escape from poverty and maximise steady-state welfare, and their values are higher 
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than when 0=z . Unlike the basic model, a child tax now increases the debt per child 
( tnz / ) due to a lower population growth in the short run. However, the increase in 
capital accumulation implies that the ratio of debt per young person over GDP per 
young person goes down in the long term. 
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